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Andreas von Hirsch was one of the first to defend an idea that has since become very 
popular: the idea that punishment can be justified, in part at least, as censure.
1
 There 
are now many different types of censure theory – some labelled communicative; some 
called expressive; some hybrid and so on.
2
 But many show the influence of von 
Hirsch’s view. In this chapter I bring together some of the basic questions that a 
censure theory would have to answer – a number of which questions von Hirsch 
himself has brought to our attention and discussed in detail. I will ask what a censure 
theory has to be like in order to give satisfactory answers to these questions. I will 
then look briefly at von Hirsch’s own version of the theory, and assess the answers 
that von Hirsch has previously given to the questions I have raised, and the answers 
that might be given on his behalf. I will suggest that thinking about the most adequate 
way to answer these questions delivers a censure theory that is different in some 
respects from the one that he puts forward.
3
 Nevertheless, the theory that I will 
recommend can be seen to take inspiration from the important work that von Hirsch 
has done on censure theory over the past forty years.  
 
I. WHY A CENSURE ACCOUNT OF PUNISHMENT? 
The turn to censure theory in the philosophy of punishment could be seen as having 
its genesis in two sources. First of all, there was growing suspicion of the 
rehabilitative paradigm in punishment.
4
 As well as increasing uncertainty about 
whether we possessed sufficient psychological knowledge to rehabilitate 
psychologically complex offenders, there were also ethical worries about open-ended 
punishments, about intrusive state intervention, and about coerced social conformity. 
In addition, there was a concern that purely rehabilitative responses to crime 
overlooked something that was an important part of human dignity and respect, 
namely that a person’s actions are something for which he can be asked to answer. As 
                                                             
1
 A von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
2
 T Metz, ‘Censure Theory and Intuitions About Punishment’ (2002) 19 Law and Philosophy 491. 
3
 For the censure account that I have defended previously, see C Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A 
Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008). For a recent re-
statement, see my ‘Punishment as an Apology Ritual’ in C Flanders and Z Hoskins (eds), The New 
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4
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a result of these concerns there was a turn towards responses to crime that were 
proportionate and external.  
Secondly, there was the result of the Hart-Devlin debate.
5
 In an important 
paper that could be thought of as dealing with what he would later call the ‘unswept 
debris’ of the Hart-Devlin debate,
6
 Joel Feinberg suggested that punishment could be 
seen as a kind of authoritative collective condemnation of wrongdoing, and that there 
would be something missing in any view of punishment that left that out.
7
 The result 
of these two sources was a view of punishment as an attempt to address the offender 
as a moral agent, responsible for his actions, with an authoritative judgement that his 
action was unacceptable. 
Some would add a third, in some ways connected strand to these two sources 
of censure theory. This third strand had to do with a growing perception that a feature 
of modern societies is that major areas of social life are annexed by state 
bureaucracies in a way that alienates people from official forms of decision-making. 
This theme, associated in the UK with the New Left amongst other groups, emerges 
in phenomena such as the restorative justice movement, and in Nils Christie’s famous 
paper, ‘Conflicts as Property’, in which he argues that the state has stolen conflicts 
from participants who would be better left to sort them out for themselves.
8
 These 
views are often morally serious about crime, and are concerned with recovering a 
sense of the moral significance of wrongdoing for its main participants. The thought 
is that the moral seriousness of crime, its moral reality, can be lost when it is 
appropriated by a state concerned purely with the efficient solving of social problems. 
Some versions of this critique are explicitly anti-statist. But for others, it is not so 
much the state that is the problem, as the fact that the particular procedures the state 
deploys to deal with important areas of social life such as crime are concerned only 
with the efficient overall management of human resources, and thus distort their 
importance, emptying them of meaning. Important human dramas, Christie argued, 
become mired in procedures that fail to resonate with the significance their original 
participants would have ascribed to them. The state deals with these issues as 
problems of efficient social management, whereas for their ‘stakeholders’ they are 
problems about building and maintaining relationships, and taking seriously the 
values inherent in such relationships. I say that this is a possible source of censure 
theory, because theories that make censure central to their account of punishment 
might share this aspiration of ‘humanising’ state institutions by insisting that they 
need not be simply driven by technical matters of behaviour management, but can be 
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II. QUESTIONS THAT A CENSURE THEORY MUST ANSWER 
However promising the turn to censure theory might be, though, any such theory will 
have to give satisfactory answers to a number of questions. Firstly, why is it important 
for the state to express censure, and in particular through punishment? Should censure 
be what Hart called the general justifying aim of punishment, and if so why? Why is it 
worth setting up a huge and costly state apparatus in order to censure people? One 
sceptical view is that censure is all very well as a method of social control for small-
scale groups, but that it will not do as an account of state punishment, where the job 
of defending individual and societal interests against threats of harm is far more 
urgent and people cannot always be expected to be stopped by a quiet word or an 
appeal to conscience. Another view, more accommodating of censure but nevertheless 
only giving it an instrumental and subsidiary role, might say that censure is all well 
and good because, in our particular social conditions, it is (one of) the best available 
means to reduce crime.
9
 But this instrumentalist view does not give censure a 
distinctive justificatory role in its own right. That is, it is not committed to the claim 
that the state has sufficient reason, independently of crime-reduction aims, to operate 
an institution of censure. It does not see censure as a legitimate and important state 
aim in its own right. In this essay I will think of censure theories as those that do take 
censure to be a sufficiently important end for the state in its own right. Such theories 
need to explain why it is that (certain forms of) wrongdoing should be censured by the 
state.  
Secondly, there are questions about the relation between the goal of censure 
and the form that such censuring takes in the operation of the system. Can censure be 
simply verbal? Or is the punishment itself required in order for censure to be 
meaningful? If the latter, why is punishment the only, or the most adequate, way to 
express moral disapproval? These are questions in particular about the justification of 
the use of hard treatment in censure, and whether the need for hard treatment is 
internal to the goal of censure (so that a successful justification of censure will itself 
justify the use of hard treatment, perhaps as a condition of the meaningfulness of the 
censure), or whether the use of hard treatment needs its own separate justification in 
terms other than censure.
10
 
Thirdly, what is the relation between state censure and our interpersonal moral 
practices of holding one another to account, criticising unacceptable behaviour, of 
blaming, apologising and forgiving? One of the apparently attractive things about the 
censure view is that it treats the offender as a moral agent. But treating someone as a 
moral agent means treating him as someone whose acts have the moral consequences 
                                                             
9
 Cf. J Braithwaite and P Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford, 
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that we take them to have in everyday practice – that when you wrong someone you 
become liable to blame, anger, withdrawal and so on, to expectations that you will 
apologise, to requiring some kind of re-acceptance and reconciliation. So does the 
censure view seek to connect state punishment to those practices?  
Fourthly, given that one of the apparent attractions of censure theory is its 
provision of determinate, proportionate punishments that fit the crime rather than the 
criminal, how does the censure theory deal with proportionality? There are perhaps 
two aspects to this question. One is what the censure theory’s view is of the basis of 
proportionality judgements. And the other is how precise proportionality judgements 
are capable of being, if they are to do the work of censure, and to what extent 
precision matters. Connected with this point is the question whether censure theory is 
capable of providing determinate guidance for sentencing theory, and whether it 
should take itself to be in that business.  
 
III. VON HIRSCH’S CENSURE THEORY 
The spirit of von Hirsch’s answers to these questions could perhaps be summed as 
follows (and here I draw largely on the account given in Censure and Sanctions).
11
 
The point of censure is that the institutions of social control must recognise our 
identity as moral agents rather than just engaging in ‘tiger control.’ The importance of 
censure is not simply reducible to its being the best available means for social control, 
as on the instrumentalist view. Rather censure has an important role in its own right. 
Censure recognises criminal action as wrongdoing and therefore also has the benefit 
that it vindicates victims, and acknowledges that what was done to them was 
unjustifiable. However, censure does not have to be expressed through punishment; it 
could equally well be expressed symbolically or verbally. The fact that we do express 
it through hard treatment is because we recognise the benefits of the threat of hard 
treatment in lowering crime. Were there no such preventive benefits this would not 
make the institution of censure redundant, since censure has an importance in its own 
right; but if this were to be the case there would be no reason for the expression of 
censure to involve hard treatment at all. However, the fact that the use of hard 
treatment is ‘optional’ does not prevent different levels of hard treatment expressing 
different degrees of censure (that is, for different degrees of seriousness of 
wrongdoing). The more serious the wrongdoing, the more severe the punishment. The 
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argument, we can see why e.g. giving hard treatment a tighter relation to the goal of censure, in order 
to accommodate proportionality, is a positive development. 
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gauging of the seriousness of crimes, however, is not simply a matter of intuition but 
a function of culpability and harm caused; and the harm component at least can be 
quantified to some extent on the basis that it concerns the impact of the crime on a 
person’s ‘living standard’. This is the basis of ordinal proportionality, or of the 
ranking of crimes from least serious to most serious, with sufficient spacing in 
between (and consistency across relevantly similar cases). We can make such ordinal 
judgements reasonably determinate. The living standard analysis also provides a basis 
on which we can make some quantification of punishments, and in such a way we can 
make judgements about punishments being excessive. However, cardinal 
proportionality – the correlation between a particular crime and a particular level of 
punishment – is conventional, though not without general moral limits such that we 
could recognise some punitive regimes as being excessively draconian.  
How does von Hirsch’s theory answer our key questions for censure theory? 
Let me leave the first question for last, since I think it is in fact not straightforward to 
address. However, what is clearer is that in answer to the second question – what form 
does censure have to take – von Hirsch’s answer is that the only necessary form that it 
has to take is something that will communicate a judgement of disapproval of 
wrongdoing. No other particular symbolic form is required. It is clearly possible, on 
von Hirsch’s view, to communicate censure by proportionate punishment, and where 
varying the hard treatment varies the level of censure. But he thinks nothing morally 
important would be lost if we did not use hard treatment. On the third question, about 
the relation between punitive state censure and our practices of accountability (blame, 
apology and forgiveness), von Hirsch is largely agnostic. He certainly doesn’t have 
the view that it is the perspective of these practices that is at the root of our sense that 
some actions require censure by the state. To answer the fourth question, about the 
basis of proportionality and the importance of precision, it seems clear that von 
Hirsch has always attempted to formulate his account in a way that will provide 
guidance for sentencing theory. This is an important and admirable goal. And clearly 
any theory of punishment has practical implications. Nevertheless we should also 
recognise that this aspiration might push us to neglect the limitations of censure 
theory. It may be that censure theory by itself provides at best wide and indeterminate 
guidance about proportionality, and that, if precision is desired, it can only be 
achieved by supplementing the censure view, either explicitly or implicitly. So what 
is the basis of proportionality on von Hirsch’s view? The official answer is that 
proportionality is required by the goals of censure.
12
 That is all very well. But what 
the goals of censure are is not yet settled. To settle the issue we will really need to 
return to the first question, that of why we should have an institution of state censure 
in the first place. Without an answer to that question we don’t really know what 
censure is doing and what demands it needs to satisfy. As a way of getting at this 
question, we might ask what is wrong, in von Hirsch’s view, with disproportionate 
punishments. What is wrong with excessive, cardinally disproportionate punishments 
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6 
 
is clear: that the offender’s interests are set back more than they needed to be. But 
what about failures of ordinal proportionality? If two offenders who have committed 
the same crimes are treated differently – if there is a failure of parity – then there is an 
unfairness done to (one of) the offenders. But what if there were insufficient spacing, 
or a mistaken rank ordering? We can’t say what would be wrong with mistaken rank 
ordering until we have explained why proportionate censure is something the state is 
required to mete out. That takes us back to the first question. 
So why does von Hirsch think that the state should be in the business of 
censuring crime? In one way the answer to this might seem obvious. Criminals are 
blameworthy – what they have done merits censure. However, that answer by itself is 
in fact insufficient, since there are blameworthy actions going on all the time that we 
don’t censure, and don’t expect the state to censure. Furthermore, it is not clear that 
this yet provides an answer to the question of what would be amiss if the state did not 
have an institution of censure. Does von Hirsch have an answer to that?  
 
IV. WHY SHOULD THE STATE CENSURE WRONGDOING? 
The idea of punishment as censure, particularly in von Hirsch’s hands, could be seen 
as a way to recover and articulate something that was important in the retributive 
tradition of thinking about punishment, but which got lost in the blaze of criticism 
over retributivism’s apparent commitment to the intrinsic goodness of the suffering of 
the morally bad. This important idea is that punishment responds to offenders (and 
suspects) as moral agents, that it treats them as accountable, as having acted for 
reasons, and therefore as having the kind of control over and responsibility for action 
that we take for granted in our everyday interpersonal dealings.
13
 When I am trying to 
arrange a meeting with you, or write a paper with you, or run a family with you, or 
buy something from you, I am not just treating you as a system of inputs and 
behavioural outputs that I attempt to manipulate in order to bring about the best (for 
myself or for society as a whole). 
One doesn’t have to be a retributivist, of course, to agree that human agents 
are more than systems of inputs and outputs, and should be respected as such. 
However, the retributive tradition – at least in what has been called its positive strand 
– has sometimes drawn on this presumed fact about our responsiveness to reasons to 
                                                             
13
 The idea that this is an important part of the retributive tradition can be traced back to H Morris, 
‘Persons and Punishment’ (1968) 52 Monist 475, and to the way Morris’s view was taken up by e.g. JG 
Murphy, ‘Marxism and Retribution’ (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 217 and J Finnis, ‘The 
Restoration of Retribution’ (1972) 32 Analysis 131. It was a Morris-type view of retribution as a 
restoration of a fair balance of benefits and burdens that informed von Hirsch’s early work, such as 
Doing Justice, above n 4; however, this view was subjected to an influential set of criticisms by RA 
Duff in the development of his communicative theory of punishment in Trials and Punishments 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986). By the time of Censure and Sanctions (above n 1), 
von Hirsch had moved decisively to the censure model. It is a censure theory justification of the view 
that I sketch below, rather than a fair balance version. 
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argue that there is also some reason in its own right that wrongdoers should get their 
just deserts; and that by extension the state, if it is best placed to do so, should be the 
one to carry this out. The corollary of this in the censure theory would be the view 
that wrongdoers should get their ‘just censure’ – and it is this view that I propose to 
consider here. On this view, there would be something lacking in a state that did not 
have an institution of censure, whether or not it was also an institution of punishment.  
What could be the argument for this positive version of censure theory? The 
argument, very briefly sketched, might go something like this. In both our thinking 
and our action, we are responsive to reasons. This is not to say that we always comply 
with those reasons, but that those reasons state a standard to which our thought and 
action has to answer. Furthermore, our reason-responsiveness is not merely internal. 
We are the sort of reason-responsive creatures who are capable of engaging in 
interpersonal thought and discussion about which reasons we should take seriously 
and act on; and when we act on bad reasons, we can appropriately be held 
accountable, and subject to criticism in which our faulty thinking is pointed out. To be 
treated as one who cannot be subject to criticism would be to be treated as an agent 
who is not responsive to reasons. Assuming that moral reasons are amongst the 
reasons to which we are responsive, we can therefore be subject to moral criticism. 
Not all faults should be subject to criticism, of course – that would lead to a 
stultifying culture of judgementalism, and moralism in the pejorative sense. But in 
some contexts, and for some wrongs, it can be important to express moral criticism. 
And although sometimes we criticise people only when there is some further end we 
seek to achieve by doing so, sometimes the faults are such that their deservingness of 
censure itself, or the need to mark or acknowledge the gravity of the wrong, is 
sufficient reason to give expression to the criticism. Therefore it can sometimes be 
neglectful of the seriousness of wrongdoing, and of the perpetrator’s identity as an 
agent competent to respond to moral reasons, if we do not subject him to moral 
criticism.  
Now von Hirsch doesn’t advert explicitly to this positive version of the thesis. 
His way of making this point tends rather to be negative, arguing that wrongdoers are 
properly seen as blameworthy, and that on this basis punishment needs to be more 
than just ‘tiger control.’ This is a negative version of the thesis because it is to argue 
for respecting moral agency as a constraint on other goals rather than as a goal in its 
own right. It is to resist having to argue for what I earlier said was the characteristic 
claim of censure theory, namely, that censure is a sufficiently important goal of the 
state.  
Nevertheless, for reasons that we shall now see, it seems wrong to classify von 
Hirsch as holding only the negative thesis. I will argue that von Hirsch is committed 
to the positive argument that the state has a sufficient reason to have an institution of 
censure, but that his writings have not addressed the justification for this claim that 
his position requires. The main reason for thinking that von Hirsch is committed to 
the positive thesis is that the negative thesis is compatible with all sorts of ways of 
8 
 
respecting the offender as a moral agent, whereas von Hirsch’s view emphasises 
censure, and takes it that only by having a censure aspect can a deterrent or protective 
institution of punishment be made compatible with respect for moral agency. The 
negative thesis is that respect for moral agency is only a constraint on goals such as 
that of social control. If von Hirsch only held the negative thesis then all he could 
consistently claim is that social control needs to be carried out in such a way as to 
respect moral agency, but where it is an open question in any situation what will be 
necessary to respect moral agency. However, that is not his view. Rather his view is 
that censure in particular is necessary as a response to certain kinds of wrongdoing. It 
is not an open question, for von Hirsch, what treatment of offenders is necessary to 
respect their moral agency, for he thinks the answer is that censure is necessary. Yet 
because von Hirsch does not explicitly give us something like the positive argument 
for censure that I sketched above, this claim goes undefended. 
To press the point, consider the possibility that there might be ways in which 
social control could be carried out that would respect those involved as moral agents, 
but that would not involve the expression of censure. The burden of von Hirsch’s 
criticism of pure deterrent or social control views is that being subjected to purely 
deterrent or incapacitative treatment would be insulting to the offender by ignoring 
his or her identity as a moral agent, that is, as one capable of understanding and 
reasoning practically about moral rules and values. But would it always be insulting 
to treat someone simply as a danger and not as a moral agent? For instance, say you 
are carrying an infectious disease, which you don’t know about; but I know, and I 
urgently need to get you into quarantine. Is it not permissible for, or even required of, 
me to do everything within my power to stop you infecting other innocent people, 
even if I can’t get you to understand the necessity for the quarantine?
14
 In urgent 
situations where there is no time to explain the reasons, it seems that it might be quite 
proportionate simply to bundle you into quarantine. Would that be like tiger control? 
Well, maybe. But what is wrong or disrespectful in subjecting a person to what 
amounts to tiger control in such a high-stakes time-limited situation? Assuming that 
deterrent punishment could – at least in some cases – be precisely that kind of 
appropriate response to a high-stakes time-limited situation, what would be wrong or 
disrespectful in these cases in subjecting someone to deterrent punishment? Or maybe 
one thinks that in order for an intervention not to be tiger control there has to be at 
least some attempt to justify what one is doing to the other person; that there must be 
some attempt to explain to him the reasons for it, and why such treatment is necessary 
(since moral agents are precisely those who are amenable to grasping such 
justifications and seeing their force). But then, applied to punishment, if a person 
were punished purely for preventive or deterrent reasons, it surely wouldn’t simply be 
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tiger control if they had it explained to them why it was necessary to treat them in that 
way. Either way, then, it seems that persons could be punished for social control 
reasons, and yet at the same time be perfectly well respected as moral agents, but 
without their having to be subject to moral criticism for their behaviour. 
The problem we are considering can be summarised as follows. If von Hirsch 
were to treat respect for moral agency merely as a constraint on otherwise warranted 
deterrent or preventive interventions, he would be unable to justify his conclusion 
that, in the context of criminal justice, such interventions would be disrespectful 
unless they also involved censure. For while there are ways of imposing deterrent or 
preventive treatment that are disrespectful, it seems that in certain circumstances such 
interventions might be perfectly compatible with the demands of respect. Yet it is 
clear from his writings that von Hirsch does believe that censure is a necessary 
component of to criminal justice measures, the component that redeems them and 
makes them compatible with respect for moral agency. To arrive at the conclusions 
von Hirsch defends, we need to show why it would be disrespectful to offenders not 
to subject them to censure, and not to mark the difference between cases of culpable 
and non-culpable harm-creation. Thus we need to fill the gap in von Hirsch’s stated 
view by providing a positive account of the role of accountability relations in our 
interpersonal dealing. This, I believe, would be to argue that there are some contexts 
in which we owe it to a person to respond to him in ways that hold him to account for 
what he has done. If, in these contexts, one simply treated the offender as a danger to 
be neutralised one would then be failing to treat him as one should – one would be 
failing to see him and deal with him in the way that should have been most salient in 
that context, i.e. as an accountable agent. If one could make this positive argument 
one would have a way of articulating the intuition that adopting a purely deterrent or 
preventive approach would involve losing something of value, without being saddled 
with the implausible view that any action that has preventive or deterrent aims, and 
which leaves out censure, is impermissible and insulting. 
In order to do that we would need a sympathetic articulation of the meaning 
and value of our practices of accountability: for example, of what underpins our sense 
that people ought to apologise for their wrongful actions; that they can stand in need 
of forgiveness before everyday business with them can be resumed; that reactions like 
distancing or, by contrast, angry confrontation, can be necessary when the wrongdoer 
is not prepared to apologise and try to put things right. By articulating the value of 
relating to people in the ways constituted by this set of accountability reactions, we 
would then have an explanation of what is wrong when these accountability reactions 
are ignored or displaced by the purely preventive – when the person is left out or 
excluded from the community defined by normative expectations and obligations to 
answer for one’s conduct. This suggests that the way to plug the gap in von Hirsch’s 
account is for censure theorists to think more carefully about my questions number 
three: the link between state censure of crime and censure as it operates in our 
everyday practices of accountability, where liability to censure figures as a marker of 
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inclusion within those practices. A successful censure theory needs some attempt to 
articulate the value of these practices and the value of inclusion within them. 
 
V. ELEMENTS OF A POSITIVE VON HIRSCHIAN CENSURE THEORY 
As I have understood it here, a censure theory that follows von Hirsch’s lead has to 
articulate a positive role for censure that does not see it simply as a means to crime 
reduction goals, as the instrumentalist does, or as nothing more than a constraint on 
the pursuit of such goals, as the purely negative thesis does. However, such a censure 
theory also has to disprove the null hypothesis, as it were. It has to explain why in any 
situation there is something wrong with doing nothing. As we noted above in 
sketching the positive argument in favour of censure, it is too simple to think that we 
should criticise one another for all our failures of reasoning, or that morality requires 
us to censure all moral wrongdoing. If we are always on the look out for one another’s 
failings, and quick to call one another out, this would lead to a culture of mutual 
suspicion, mistrust, and a lack of individual privacy and room for authenticity, 
spontaneity and experimentation. Thus it is not always one’s business to concern 
oneself with others’ moral character, and not always even with the way they treat 
others (though there can be a point at which protecting the vulnerable trumps the need 
to respect others’ rights to be left alone). My wrongdoing is not always your business. 
But this suggests that doing nothing in the face of wrongdoing is a real option, and 
perhaps often the right option. We therefore need some account of when it is wrong to 
do nothing in the face of wrongdoing, and why in those circumstances it is wrong; 
and we need an account specifically of why censure is necessary in those 
circumstances, and thus of why it would be wrong not to censure. 
The kind of account that censure theory is looking for will therefore have to 
explain three things. First of all, it has to explain the character of the wrong involved 
in failing to censure. Secondly, it will have to explain something about the kinds of 
circumstances in which it is wrong not to censure, and what makes those 
circumstances special. And thirdly, it will have to explain how all this relates to 
punishment and the actual operation of sentencing in a criminal justice system. 
If this is the right way for a von Hirschian account to proceed, we have to bear 
in mind that the account of what is wrong with failing to censure cannot be an 
instrumentalist one. According to the instrumentalist, the point of censuring is only to 
further certain independent goals to which censuring is the best available means. The 
instrumentalist therefore has an answer to the question of when it is wrong to fail to 
censure. It is wrong to fail to censure, on the instrumentalist view, whenever one’s 
censure would have led to the production of benefits, or the avoidance of harms, 
which could not have been produced/avoided in any more cost-effective way. If 
censure is justified simply in terms of its tendency to inhibit harmful behaviour then it 
is wrong not to express censure in those circumstances in which it would have been 
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cost-effective in doing so. While the censure theory we are thinking of here can avail 
itself of foreseen benefits such as this, the production of benefits and avoidance of 
harm cannot be the whole story in the justification of censure. To put it in terms of a 
well-known dichotomy, the instrumentalist account gives a purely forward-looking 
account of the explanation of what is wrong with failing to censure, appealing to 
benefits and harms that are independent of the offence but might be produced by 
various ways of responding to the offence; whereas the censure account is 
fundamentally backward-looking, and has to do, in some sense, with the offence 
itself. 
Once we have put the matter this way, however, it might look as though the 
censure theorist has not left herself very much room for manoeuvre. What kind of 
story can we appeal to that will explain what is wrong with failing to censure, but 
where this explanation appeals simply to ‘the offence itself’? In order to fill out this 
positive account, I think, we need to turn to another neglected aspect of the retributive 
tradition. Again this has nothing to do with the supposed importance of making bad 
people suffer. Rather it has to do with the need not to acquiesce in the wrongdoing of 
others. In other words, the backward-looking view does not quite take its starting 
point from ‘the offence itself,’ but from the relation that the person censuring (or not) 
has to the offence, and whether that relation is a permissible one or not. Central to the 
retributive tradition is the thought that, as a non-contingent matter, it can be wrong 
not to make certain kinds of responses to wrongdoing. On a simple form of 
retributivism, this might be the view that it is somehow wrong not to pursue the 
suffering of the perpetrator, and to avenge oneself or the victim on him. But more 
sophisticated forms of retributivism will have the same structure: they simply involve 
more sophisticated views about what the appropriate responses to wrongdoing can be 
(for instance, distancing the wrongdoer or altering one’s relationship with him; the 
wrongdoer feeling guilty, or making amends, etc). These more sophisticated forms of 
retributivism will still take it to be wrong, as a non-contingent matter, not to engage in 
those appropriate responses. But what kind of wrong can that be, which is not 
contingent on the harms or benefits that might stem from one’s action or inaction? My 
thought is that it must be a wrong that involves a failure to stand in the right relation 
to the offence and to the offender: that sometimes when we fail to censure 
wrongdoing, we are effectively consenting to it, acquiescing in it, condoning it, and 
hence becoming complicit in it. The central thought on this aspect of the retributive 
tradition is that it is wrong to allow the original offence to persist, unanswered. When 
it does, we are implicated in the wrongdoing unless we do something to dissociate 
ourselves from it; and it is the act of censure that does the dissociating.  
As we have seen, however, it is not always wrong not to censure wrongdoing; 
for it is not always the case that we are implicated in the wrongdoing unless we 
dissociate ourselves from it. Sometimes the null hypothesis is quite right. Indeed, the 
default position may well be that wrongdoing places us under no particular duty to 
dissociate ourselves from it. There is wrongdoing going on all over the place as I 
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write and yet here I am blithely typing away. More plausibly, then, it is because of 
some special relation that one has to the circumstances of the offence and to those 
involved in it that one would be implicated in the wrongdoing if one were not to 
dissociate oneself from it. Yet sometimes there are such special relations, and in those 
cases one has reasons to dissociate.  
The view that we have reasons to avoid complicity in the wrongdoing of 
others, and that these can be the most fundamental reasons that we have to censure 
others, to which instrumental reasons are additional, might raise some concerns. One 
likely worry is that this view sounds like moral self-indulgence.
15
 Is the concern to 
have ‘the right relation’ to the offence not a self-centred matter of keeping one’s 
hands clean? And does that not distract attention from the real matter of concern, 
which is how the victims have been treated?
16
 Although I agree that it is the victims 
that should be the central matter of concern, I find these criticisms unpersuasive. As I 
understand it, it is a fundamental moral task for each of us to determine where we 
stand on the things that go on around us, and whether we are prepared to live with 
them or not. The decision to censure can simply be an expression of revolt against 
some event, something in us that says that we cannot accept it, and that we stand 
against it. I think this is a familiar and morally important experience. Furthermore, it 
is not enough to see such reactions as simply our letting off steam. This would be an 
explanation of these reactions that was psychological rather than moral – that pointed 
to the quirks of our individual psychology, as if it would have been acceptable just to 
have been a bit more patient, or a bit less hot-headed. Of course, sometimes our 
reactions are simply letting off steam, or grandstanding, or signalling to those whose 
respect we desire. Sometimes, however, they are virtuous, and not self-absorbed: for 
instance, when we have to express our inability to tolerate even those things that we 
cannot change. More adequate, therefore, is the view that what is going on in such 
situations is that we are faced with some moral necessity not to treat wrongs as though 
they were permissible, and that it is constitutive of treating them as impermissible that 
we censure them. We withdraw our consent from those things, as it were, opposing 
them even when we cannot now change them, by expressing our censure. 
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Therefore the view that we can have weighty reasons to dissociate ourselves 
from wrongdoing by censuring it does not call on us to replace concern for the victim 
of wrongdoing with concern for one’s own moral character. Rather the need for 
dissociation is an expression of revolt at the way the victim was treated, and an 
inability – a moral inability – to stand by and treat it as something that just happens, 
or is someone else’s business. Therefore one’s feeling of complicity in the offence, 
should one say nothing, is intimately bound up with the sense that, with one’s silence, 
one would be letting the victim down.  
Furthermore, it is also worth noting that there is an important sense in which a 
failure to censure can involve letting the wrongdoer down. To treat a wrongdoer as if 
her actions can cause us to be complicit is to treat her as someone whose actions can 
have an impact on us. We do not choose that others should do wrong, but sometimes 
they do; and on the view being put forward here, even though we cannot change the 
fact that they did what they did, we sometimes have an obligation to do the next best 
thing, which is to express our opposition to what they did, the result of which is that 
we can have duties, unbidden, to dissociate ourselves from those actions. That means 
that the actions of (some) others can have an impact on us, independently of whether 
we choose them to. To regard someone as one whose actions can have an impact on 
one in this way is to regard them as being in some kind of community with one; to 
disregard that, and to act as though there is not complicity in question, is to repudiate 
such community. This is the sense in which the failure to react to the offender by 
dissociating from her action can be to exclude her: for it is to treat her as though there 
was no community existing between you such that her actions would have any call on 
you. 
I have argued that a successful censure theory – as we have understood it here 
as a positive but non-instrumental justification for a censuring response to crime – 
rests on an account of the need for dissociation from wrongdoing. Now readers who 
have followed the argument up to this point might agree that the phenomenon of 
complicity and dissociation that I have attempted to evoke is a recognisable part of 
the moral life. However, they might say, it seems a big step from this to the claim that 
this is also what is going on in the fundamental justification of a society’s criminal 
justice system. Some might worry that claiming that the state, or its citizens, would be 
complicit in wrongdoing if they did not censure wrongdoing, might seem little better 
than metaphorical. How are we to make that conclusion plausible? Of course, one 
way to go would be to acknowledge that the criminal justice system as envisaged by 
the censure theory, although it makes sense, is not particularly important as a part of a 
modern polity. However, although I think we should always have that possibility 
before our eyes when dealing with any questions about the institution of punishment, 
it may be that this defeatist conclusion is too quick. So let us turn to our second 
question, that of the circumstances in which we can become complicit in others’ 
wrongdoing. We are not always in the kind of community with others such that 
responsibilities arise for us to take a stand on their wrongdoing. But sometimes we 
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are. One such case is worth briefly mentioning here, as it is directly relevant to the 
case of punishment, and to censure as the justifying purpose of punishment.  
The worry might be that complicity can only come about from direct 
engagement with wrongdoing (‘aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring,’ as the 
law has it), and therefore that the claim that the state or citizens would be complicit in 
wrongdoing were they not to censure cannot be sustained. Nevertheless, the law 
seems not to agree. At any rate, as Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder note, the 
law does seem to recognise cases of what we might call complicity through normative 
control;
17
 and I want to argue that such cases can form a basis for a reasonable theory 
of the need for dissociation. In such cases, the wrongdoing of the complicit parties 
does not consist in their having direct control over an outcome – as one does who 
actually passes a murder weapon to the principal, or who distracts the security guard 
so that a crime can occur – but rather in their having authority over some domain in 
which the crime is committed, and hence control over whether the criminal act is done 
with their permission or not. An example is the case of a car owner who permits 
another to engage in reckless behaviour while driving the car.
18
 It need not necessarily 
be the case that the owner could have prevented the reckless driving. Hence it is not 
necessary that the owner had physical control over whether the crime came about. 
The owner’s wrong is not therefore a failure to exercise such physical control. The 
wrong rather centres on the fact that the owner could and should have made it clear 
that the reckless behaviour was not happening with his permission. He should have 
withdrawn his consent from it, a power he had as the owner of the car with normative 
control over the domain in which the crime was committed. 
Now, we can draw a line between this kind of case and the claim that citizens 
and state can indeed be complicit in individuals’ wrongdoing, as the same structural 
features are in place in both cases. One aspect of the circumstances of modern 
political community is that the state (or citizens as a whole where the state is a 
democratic one) has authority over the domain in which crimes are committed. This is 
not the case for every form of life, but applies to what are recognisably law-governed 
societies. What I mean by authority is simply that the state has a legal power through 
which it can determine whether some act is (legally) permissible or impermissible. 
The law is an apparatus by which the state can mark acts as impermissible, putting 
citizens under a legal obligation not to perform them. If we assume that the state does 
in fact possess authority in making such acts impermissible, then we can say that by 
virtue of these structures of legal regulation, the state now has a legal power to 
determine whether criminal actions are done with its permission or not. If this seems 
plausible, we can say that, wherever the state does not mark some act as 
impermissible, it regards it as permissible. It does not always have the power to 
prevent wrongdoing from occurring, but it has the power to determine whether the 
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wrongdoing happens with its permission or not. Now on the assumption that there are 
principles governing which acts it should mark as impermissible and which not, it can 
be complicit in allowing some acts to be permissible where it should have made them 
impermissible. In such a case there is something very much like complicity that 
comes about through a failure to criminalise, and the same argument applies (in 
principle at least) to a failure to censure violations of criminal law. The obligation to 
censure comes about as a result of the need to mark violations of the criminal law as 
cases of wrongdoing that were done without the state’s permission: it would be 
complicity through the state’s failure to make clear its attitude of disapproval of 
certain acts by marking them as impermissible. Here the state would indeed have 
duties to censure, and would be complicit in virtue of acquiescing in wrongdoing over 
which it had normative control. If the citizens of the state can intelligibly be seen as 
joint holders of the legal power to mark acts as impermissible, then they can also be 
seen as implicated in the failure to censure. If this sounds plausible, the idea of the 





VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF RECONSTRUCTING VON HIRSCH’S VIEW 
I have claimed that von Hirsch’s view must be supplemented by an attempt to explain 
why there is a positive role for censure. The answer I have suggested is that censure is 
necessary because – but only insofar as – we would be complicit in the actions of 
others, and we must dissociate ourselves from them by marking those acts as wrong, 
and distancing ourselves from them. We are at risk of such complicity when we stand 
in certain kinds of relations of community with the wrongdoer, such that we would be 
acquiescing in her action if we were not to dissociate ourselves from it. Censure does 
that distancing. If this account is successful, it provides something lacking from, but 
needed by von Hirsch’s account.  
Three implications of the foregoing should quickly be noted, relating to the 
second, third and fourth questions raised in section I. First of all, in relation to the 
question of whether we should follow von Hirsch in thinking that the form that 
censure takes can be merely verbal, I think we have found reasons to dispute this. 
From the point of view of the theory developed in section V, the question is, ‘What 
form does censure have to take if it is to dissociate the state from the wrongdoing?’ 
Can a purely verbal expression of censure be enough? My reason for doubting this is 
that words are cheap, and that the crucial thing when expressing dissociation is to 
show the way in which the wrongdoing matters. It may be that for minor wrongdoing 
simply verbal censure would be enough, but more significant cases require something 
more to mark the moral breach involved. This relates to the question of the relation 
between state punishment and our everyday moral practices of accountability.  
Dissociation unavoidably takes place through action that is expressive and symbolic, 
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and the state must find a symbolic language for marking the action as wrong: but 
where else could it find such a thing other than in our fundamental practices of 
accountability? Censure that does not appeal to the ways in which we understand 
dissociation to come about in our practices of accountability would lack meaning, will 
not be capable of showing the way in which the wrongdoing matters, and will not be 
capable of dissociating the political community from wrongdoing. State censure can 
therefore be seen ideally as an institutional expression of accountability practices that 
structure everyday life in the polity. In that way the reconstructed censure view whose 
contours I have sketched here can perhaps lay a greater claim to speak to what I called 
in section I of this essay the third source of motivation for censure views, that they 
should ‘humanise’ state institutions and restore a sense of the moral significance of 
crime. Nevertheless, despite this connection to moral practice, it is not clear to me that 
the censure view would be suitable only for a small-scale or rather homogenous 
society, and unsuitable for large-scale political societies: the account is suitable for a 
society whose members understand themselves to be bound closely enough that what 
one person does impacts on others, not just by directly affecting them, but in a sense 
that they have to take a stand on whether such actions are going to be acceptable.  
What should the censure theory say about proportionality? As with the basic 
understanding of what dissociation involves, the censure view we are now imagining 
takes the root source of our understanding of proportionality to be the moral practices 
that structure the everyday life of the polity. I take it that we have some understanding 
of how to answer such questions – enough to structure a practice in which we 
deliberate about what to do, discuss with others whether some suggested response is 
enough, criticise people for not doing enough (or too much), and have regrets about 
not doing enough. But the understanding we have is likely to be highly context-
sensitive and perhaps uncodifiable. It may come more in the shape of responses to 
examples than in general principles. Furthermore, proportionality in responses to 
wrongdoing is contestable, and no doubt subject to reasonable disagreement and 
cultural difference. I think censure theory has to be fairly open about the lack of 
determinacy in our judgements of proportionality. That’s not the end of the story, 
however. It simply raises the question of what the pros and cons are of allowing 
discretion at the point of sentencing. Or perhaps one job of democratic politics is to 
formulate reasonably precise standards of ‘what fits the crime’ in the shape of 
sentencing guidelines. At any rate, concerns that a censure theory does not give us a 
clear account of proportionality do not seem to me to point to a fatal flaw in the 
account. Many questions about proportionality simply cannot be decided without 
detailed examination of cases, and it may be that they have to be left to the discretion 





In this paper I have attempted to do justice to Andreas von Hirsch’s fertile writings on 
the topic of censure theory. I have assessed von Hirsch’s view in terms of the 
questions that a censure theory has to have answers for, and as a result I have found it 
necessary to supplement a von Hirschian approach in some important ways. I have 
argued that von Hirsch’s view pays too little attention to the question of what the 
moral basis of an institution of censure is, and that as a result we are ultimately left 
unable to give full answers to the other questions that a censure theory has to deal 
with. I think that once we fill the gaps we have reason to draw some implications 
from censure theory that challenge some of the conclusions that von Hirsch himself 
draws. Nevertheless, the theory that we have ended up with is one that, I believe, 
recognisably takes inspiration from von Hirsch’s seminal work. 
